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A scene of confusion at the Afghan National Army training camp on Jalalabad Road. Kabul, Afghanistan. 28 November 2006...The lack of properly prepared and readily available plans for operations in Afghanistan after 9/11 was to have fatal consequences for America. Being the first on the ground, CIA operators began by leveraging intelligence assets and personal relationships with anti-Taliban militias, mainly the Northern Alliance, and entered into partnerships that ultimately undermined the creation and role of the ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP)...What follows are some of the lessons learned and discussed by John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in “Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,” September 2017...Eventually, “the 2002 division of security sector reform into the five independent silos of military reform (U.S.), police reform (Germany), judicial reform (Italy), counter-narcotics (U.K.), and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (Japan) undermined each individual program's success as the process lacked the required coordination and synchronization effort.” ..As senior U.S. and NATO officials took ownership of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), little input came from senior Afghan officials. “The lack of Afghan ownership of force development, operational planning, and security sector governance prevented the Afghans from effectively overseeing and managing the ANDSF following the security transition at the end of 2014.” ..“The United States largely ignored the transitional security forces operating throughout Afghanistan, as well as the political imbalances throughout the rank-and-file that were eroding security, both of which were often supported by host-nation elites. As a result, major social and political imbalances remain with the ANDSF to this day.” ..“Western advisers are likely to step in to perform jobs (KEYSTONE/VII Photo/Daniel Schwartz)